Editorial by Dreier, Ole
N
ielsen’s article is a critical analysis of
recent tendencies to reverse traditional
views on knowledge by advocating
tacit knowledge. He argues that we must un-
derstand the re-emphasis on tacit knowledge
based on the practical functionality of partic-
ular modes of knowledge and of matters of
knowing altogether in social practice. In so
doing, Nielsen unfolds a critique of tacit
knowledge from the perspective of a histori-
cally changing social practice in which the
concept is launched to deal with issues ema-
nating from changes in the forms of knowl-
edge and expertise. Growing information
technologies raise issues for the expertise of
the growing professions, and problems arise
from using tacit knowledge as a legitimating
concept for professional practitioners. The
inexpressibility of tacit knowledge may sus-
tain and strengthen a professional mystique,
reifying the conduct of professional practice
while making it more inaccessible to out-
siders and practitioners alike. By defining a
certain tacit knowledge as the common core
of a profession each profession is construed
as a unity different from all other profession-
al groups, and all members of a group are be-
lieved to be alike in possessing the same
common core. Experiences not fitting into
this common construct are marginalized, and
individuality, knowledge and competence
de-contextualized. All in all, the concept of
tacit knowledge tends to turn power relations
into questions of knowledge and epistemolo-
gy and to deal with them as such. 
Solheim offers another critique of knowl-
edge in a theoretical conception: conversa-
tional analysis. Warning against a narrow
empiricism he looks at the status of its basic
conceptual assumptions pledging for a
broader conceptual foundation in studying
ongoing talk. Using materials from his study
of educational talk in classrooms Solheim ar-
gues that an analysis of the sequential organi-
zation of discourse through participants’
turn-taking cannot capture their concerns,
learning and meaning making. Warning, like
Nielsen, against privileging expert knowl-
edge he appreciates that order is understood
through the ways in which people themselves
make this order available to each other in lo-
cal activity and that subjects are seen as
knowledgeable. Still, this easily leads into a
version of empiricism. Researchers also need
to focus on the taken for granted, the tacit, the
unsaid, even on how the repression of knowl-
edgeability is accomplished. A conceptual
focus on the content of talk is missing, and
the fundamental ideas, practices and methods
of pedagogical school activities are insuffi-
ciently understood. That calls for a situated,
empirical demonstration of the significance
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of persistent social, institutional structures.
Solheim, therefore, ends with a critical look
at activity theory which emphasizes that or-
ganizations have histories and operate as
meeting grounds for multiple argumentative
threads, searches for the dynamics and possi-
bilities of change and considers the use of ar-
tifacts and tools. 
The three remaining articles are about
drug taking and stem from the same seminar,
organized by Outlines and the “Center for
Health, Humanity and Culture”, as Val-
verde’s article in our previous issue. The first
article here is also about the subjectivity of
drug use while the two last ones are about
drug policies and professional treatment
practices. 
Nissen’s wide-ranging, searching and out-
lining theoretical essay studies issues of sub-
jectivity in contemporary practices of drug
taking. Setting out from the socio-cultural di-
chotomy between individual autonomy and
determinism that makes drug misuse appear
as a negation of autonomous self-control, he
insists that we cannot get around the issue of
the self-dissolution of the subject in drug tak-
ing as (feigned) surrender or suicide. His cri-
tical-psychological approach does not, as
some critics complain, confuse subjectivity
with individual control and self-mastery.
Drug taking also involves relations between
the subject and the body. The experience of
intoxication draws attention to the fragility of
our bodily existence, and drugs facilitate and
shape our ways of transforming or avoiding
pain and exhaustion. Indeed, the industrial
production and mass consumption of all sorts
of drugs must be taken into account in under-
standing drug taking. Drugs exist as cultural-
ly given fixes to solve human problems
which, nonetheless, like other commodities,
change us in unintended ways. We may use
drugs instrumentally as a collective chemical
technology of the self, and they may recreate
us as dependent subjects. But willfully sur-
rendering to the effect of the drug in our body
is a special kind of surrendering to something
we invented to suit our purposes. Nissen in-
troduces a case study of a young woman
coming to an understanding of herself and
with herself about her drug taking and her re-
lationship to the communities of Narcotics
Anonymous and Wild Learning arguing that
merging into these communities as powers
larger than herself she illustrates a benevo-
lent surrender. 
Pedersen also takes an historical approach
to drug addiction studying the conceptions of
subjectivity involved in the historically
changing Danish regimes of drug treatment,
in particular the place of methadone therein.
According to his Foucauldian analysis, in lib-
eral societies the free will of client subject is
constituted both as a reality and as something
to be produced as a governable object. Peder-
sen illustrates how the changing Danish
treatment regimes produce different forms of
subjectification of drug addicts governing
how they develop relations to themselves,
work upon them selves and construct them-
selves as subjects performing their freedom
in particular ways. 
Svensson’s article is a historical analysis
too, namely of the history of compulsory care
of drug misusers as a part of the Swedish
welfare state with its historically changing
legislations, institutions, understandings and
practices. She shows us the kind of under-
standing we may be led to if we stop believ-
ing that it is possible to separate power and
care. From a broad Foucauldian conception
of power she emphasizes that there is no
room for separating support and control in
social work, that care can be a technique of
power and that coercion may also be under-
stood as giving opportunities for a better life.
Ole Dreier
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